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When one reads the dally newspaper or listens to a news broadcast -
the only contact the average citizen has with his country's foreign
policy - the awareness that long-term ideals are being sacrificed for
short-tera exigencies strikes a discordant note in one's sense of
balance between right and wrong. One then wonders if policy-makers
are aware of those ideals and if such ideals can ever become realistic
objectives, or if instead life is composed of a series of short-term
goals which must be constantly adjusted to the realities of the present
and within which there is little, if any, room for ideals that may
differ from such goals.
This paper will address itself to this dilemma and hopefully answer
many of the questions raised by foreign policy. First, a theoretical
analysis of idealism and realism in an international relations framework
will be carried out, then, a dissertation on the role of the arms trade
in foreign policy will follow, and finally an illustration of this
confrontation between realism and idealism will be provided by focusing
on Britain's arms trade with South Africa. The arms trade was selected to
demonstrate the clash between realists and idealists in the formulation of
foreign policy because it embodies all the main elements of their
respective arguments.
The question of realism versus idealism is often regarded to be a
philosophical argument which is not clearly applicable to today's
extremely complex decision-making process in international relations -
a reaction due as much to the inability to define these terms in a more
precise manner as to the emotion, and consequent loss of objectivity,
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that such a discussion precipitates. This paper will strive to
present an objective analysis of these terns and relate them to the
actual effects they have on the decision-making process of foreign
policy.
Idealism tends to be exemplified by solutions which are the
product not of analysis but of aspiration, and since the Initial
aspiration towards an and is an essential foundation of human thinking,
idealism is a key element in all thought processes including decision-
making. The best manner of defining this term is to focus on what are
considered to be commonly professed ideals such as honesty, truthfulness,
fidelity to obligation, kindness, fair play, lawfulness, and non-
intervention in other people's affairs. By noting that these ideals
are ethical restraints upon egoism which operate through force of
conscience, custom, or law, the meaning of the term and its significance
become clearer. If one then includes the allegiance to a universal
goal, that is some state of affairs believed to be of benefit to all
mankind (such as peace, goodwill, justice among nations, freedom, and
a decent standard of living for all) , the definition of idealism becomes
complete.
Realism, on the other hand, is often characterised as marking the
end of the Utopian stage of human thinking as it places its emphasis on the
acceptance of facts and on the analysis of their causes and consequences.
Thus while idealism concentrates on aspirations, realism focuses on the
acceptance of facts and, especially in a political context, on the nature
and effects of power.
laving thus introduced these two concepts, one must then consider
how they serve to shape the attitudes of different people, for it is
through people that the conflict between them will be created. One
concrete expression of this difference between idealist and realist
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is provided by the opposition between intellectual and bureaucrat. The
bureaucratic approach is fundamentally empirical as it is guided by
precedent, by instinct, and by feel for the right thing. The intellectual,
though, insists on general principles taken as absolute standards and
adjudges policies to be good or bad by the extent to which they conform,
or diverge, froa these standards. While such an application of these
concepts say a^r^f to highlight an inevitable clash within a political
context, idealism and realism are likewise reflected on a broader
basis in the split between Left and Kight. Thus the intellectual, a
man of theory, will naturally gravitate towards the Left while the bureau-
crat, a man of practice, gravitates towards the Right. In consequence
the Right is often weak in theory while the Left suffers from a failure
to translate theory into practice - a failure for which it blames the
bureaucrats, but which is inherent in its Utopian character.
In such a discussion one must also consider a social element which
not only further delineates the schism between idealism and realism
but also further emphasises the relevance of their application to a
political context. The key element is power. Interest defined in terms
of power is the cornerstone of realism in international politics since
it helps avoid the issue of motives of statesmen as well as philosophic
and political sympathies as reasons for policy. Muincy Wright adds
to this identity of realism with power by noting that realists base
their philosophy on the proposition that "states seek to enhance their power"
which leads them to conclude that power is the supreme value for which
states strive. If one then considers that the use of power and
1. M.Rtkove ed. , Arms and Foreign xolicy in the Nuclear Age (London, 1972), p.53«
j
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more specifically force, or the threat of its uae, as a means of
applying pressure in international relations merely reflects the
lack of an impartial judge under an established law, one can gain
an insight into the conflict between realism and idealism which results.
Force corrupts the purity and perverts the use of moral ideas and
hence this application of realism, in the form of power, leads to an
erosion of idealism in foreign policy. While Idealists might respond
to a question of power by citing their preference for universal goals
such as peace, they are disregarding the fact that ideals are as much an
instrument of national power as the weapons of war, for in as much
as power is used to influence other people or nations this can be done by
frightening them or converting them. Men are motivated by faith and moral
sentiment as well as by fear and the instinct of self-preservation.
Having thus established a theoretical base and having shown its
very real link to a political environment, one must now establish its
relevance to international relations and more specifically to the
implementation of foreign policy.
Osgood notes that the conflict of ideals and self-interest within
an international context dates back deep into history as he quotes
Pericles* Funeral Oration which proclaimed that only Athens obeyed the
dictates of the highest morality because "we alone do good to our
neighbors not upon a calculation of interest, but in the confidence
of freedom and in a frank and fearless spirit". He likewise proposed
distinguishing definitions for these terms within an international context.
1. Quoted infi.Osgood, Ideals and Self-interest in America's Foreign Relations ,
(Chicago! Univ. of Chicago Press, 1953) p«l-

5.
By narrowing down realism so that it becomes national self-interest,
he states that national self-interest becomes a state of affairs valued
solely for its benefit to the nation while an ideal is a state of affairs,
or standard of conduct, worthy of achievement by virtue of its universal
moral value.
Such a definition obviously leaves out many important elements,
but a closer look will show that all one is really required to do is
expand upon that which is implied in the basic definition. Thus when
one considers idealism in an international text one notes that this
allegiance to a universal goal, or a universal moral value, may be such
that it demands dedication to the welfare of other nations and peoples
without regard for one's own national welfare. The ultimate form of this
idealism being national self-sacrifice which demands the deliberate
surrender of one's own national self-interest for the sake of other
nations or for the sake of some moral principle or universal goal.
Some even envisage this as the surrender of national survival itself
if so required. Nevertheless, since international society is morally
and institutionally imperfect, even if perfect ideals were pursued
disappointment would follow because the effective means fall short of
ideal standards. Hence the idealist is beginning to acknowledge that
in the real world of conflicting national purposes ideal goals are not
obtained by moral fervor alone but rather by a pragmatic calculation
of the means to an end and by the rational consideration of the consequences
of a given action. An example of this might be Britain's Labour party
being able to pursue a more substantial anti-apartheid policy with
regards to South Africa having considered the effect that such a stance
will have among Black African nations as well as being aware that the




result of British non-cooperation with, the South African regime.
The concept of realism likewise suffers from such narrow
interpretation, and even though one might be willing to acknowledge
the preponderance of self-interest in such a context, one must be prepared
to provide it with greater sustenance.
One such supporting concept is that of national security which,
due to its close association with national self-preservation, provides
national egoism with a rational and moral justification which renders
the primacy of self-interest among national ends an indisputable and
unavoidable reality of international politics. In practice this
means an understanding that the exercise of national power (that is
the ability of one nation to influence others to do its will) is
considered to be the most important means of achieving national ends.
Thus international relations are bound to be characterized by a struggle
for power among nations in pursuit of their own interests. The realist,
therefore, considering this competition for power to be the
distinguishing characteristic of international relations, is sceptical
of attempts to solve international conflict through appeals to
sentiment and principle. He feels instead that power conflicts can only
be mitigated by balancing power against power.
Osgood notes that a true realist must be aware of the interdependence
of realism and idealism, and that even on grounds of national expediency
there are valid arguments for maintaining the vitality of a country's
1
ideals. One may well question the validity of meriting the realist,




alone, with such wisdom, but it certainly does underline the dilemma
which a nation faces when attempting to reconcile its self-interest
with its ideals. Qtfite obviously national sentiment restricts the
extent to which a nation can be expected to transcend its
own self-interest for the sake of universal principles or the welfare
of others. Tet one can not deny that idealism has great influence
on the actions of both nations and individuals ana. in many cases
moderates aggressive manifestations of self-interest.
Nevertheless, as noted above in the Britain-South Africa example,
this moral force seems to be most compelling when the pursuit of
ideals coincides with the national advantage.
This integration of realism and idealism also may create a
situation where a nation may be called upon to sacrifice its ideals
in the short-run in order to achieve them in the long-run. This will
require individuals to reconcile the immediate demands of national
expediency with the traditional principles of their ideals which may
well lead to an inconsistency between their ideals and their actions.
As the contradictions between ideals and self-interest multiply, the
problem becomes infinitely more complex. Balanning present loss for
future gain becomes increasingly difficult , and when such an operation
requires the compromising of one's principles, in order to promote them,
man's limited reason is indeed strained.
Osgood sums up the importance of idealism and realism as generating
factors in the making of foreign policy as well as the problems the
conflict between them creates superbly when he states: "In its broadest
aspect, the interdependence of universal ideals and national self-interest
is simply a reflection of the fact that man has a moral sense as well
as an ego and that both parts demand satisfaction. For this reason the
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most compelling national ends are those self-interested ends, like
survival, which are most easily reconciled with idealistic ends, and those
idealistic ends, like the minimum standards of international decency,
which are most compatible with national self-interest. By the same
token, the instability of self-assertive egoism and altruistic idealism
can be attributed, in large part, to the incompatibility of the former
with fundamental ideals and of the latter with the most basic national
interests."
Once the conflict between these two concepts has been incorporated
into the international scene, as was done above, one must then firmly
establish that the making of foreign policy is indeed directly effected
by this conflict. George Kennan and Max 3eloff do this quite
adequately even though they areboth rather obviously partial to the
realist approach. Kennan proposes that the conduct of foreign relations
should not be considered as a purpose in itself for a political society
particularly a democratic one, but rather as a means of pursuing some higher
and more comprehensive purpose. He thus states that a political society
does not live to conduct foreign policy but rather that it conducts
foreign policy in order to live which implies a belief that foreign
policy is merely a means to an end. While the end being pursued, mainly
Lockean principles such as life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and the
protection of property rights, contains elements of both realism and
idealism, Kennan clearly demonstrates his preference as he focuses
on the need to guarantee these rights from external or political intrusion
by protecting citizens who are engaged in private activity abroad.
1. R.K.Osgood, Ideals and Self-interest in America's Foreign Relations , p. 17.
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He views idealism in foreign policy as being devoid of an
awareness of the power factor in the scheme of foreign relations,
and blames such lack of awareness for such things as the negotiation
of an extensive framework of treaties of arbitration and conciliation.
Noting that by the 1930* s ninety-seven international agreements of
arbitration or conciliation had been ratified and yet the result of
all this work was the arbitration of only two disputes based on these
instruments (and there is no reason to believe that they would not
have been arbitrated any way in the absence of such treaties), he
suggests that such idealism only masked the realities of the power
conflicts experienced in two World Wars. This leads to his
appro ch to morality in international relations which he states as:
"Morality in governmental method, as a matter of conscience and
preference on the part of our people - yes. Morality as a general
criterion for measuring and comparing the behaviour of different states -
no". He adds that there are no universally applicable standards of
morality for individuals, beyond obvious rules of prudence common to
most of mankind due to the necessity to preserve the family structure and
the good order in society , and thus how much more difficult it has to
be to find universal rules for government. Especially when the
governments must engage in the chore of imposing restraint by man over
man as a result of man's irrational nature, selfishness, obstinacy,
and tendency to violence. He consequently, not surprisingly, urges
less sentimentality and less eagerness to be morally impressive in
relations between governments. While one may opt to disagree with
1. G.F.Kennan, Realities of American Foreign Policy (London: Oxford Univ.
Press, 195*0 p. 50.
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such an approach, it is important to consider it, for it highlights
the incessant struggle between realism and idealism.
Max Beloff also favours the realist approach but adds to the
discussion by focusing on what he considers to be shortcomings on the
part of the idealists and in the process raises some very interesting
points. He addresses the question of recognition of one country
by another by first pointing to the traditional view that the only
test is whether or not the government is in control of the national
territory and is likely to remain so, and then, noting that democracies
are not happy with this version. He explains this dislike by
observing that individuals tend to want to elevate personal
relationships to an international level and thus since one selects one's
friends, they feel that it is possible to choose those governments with
whom one has dealings and to ignore those of whose ideologies or
practices one disapproves. This attitude is coupled with the belief,
stated or unstated, that nonrecognition will hence lead to the overthrow
of the unpopular regime and the lise of a better social order, an
expectation which history shows to be misguided (U.S. -China). Such an
observation also emphasizes one more area of contention between realists
and idealists as the former note that in international affairs it is
governments, not people, with whom one must deal while this affronts
the latter who yearns for people to people relations. Bbloff summarizes
his identification of the public with idealism and his criticism of such
attitudes by stating "what the public mind largely acts upon in foreign
policy is a series of myths about the past - myths which indulge
democracies in the fallacy that the right course is always ascertainable
1. M. Beloff , Foreign Policy and the Democratic Process (Baltimore: John





As noted already, these two figures are biased quite unambiguously
toward the realist approach to foreign policy, and yet this in no way
lessens their contribution to the discussion, dy focusing on areas
of contention between realists and idealists in the formulation of
foreign policy, tney more accurately and explicitly demonstrate that
these two divergent forces are in constant struggle with each other
on matters of foreign policy.
To provide what has been largely a theoretical discussion of the
inherent strife between realism ana idealism and of the manner in
which such conflict is applicable to the formulation of foreign policy
with real meaning, one must focus upon the foreign policy of a specific
nation and try to ascertain whether in fact such conflict exists.
Since the United States foreign policy is universally scrutinized, it
seems to be the best choice. Also rether than pointing to a rather
obvious confrontation between groups with opposing views, it will be
more enlightening to note how idealists must struggle and compromise
when faced with the simple, realities of international affairs. Thus
as Osgood observes
"liberal idealists and international reformers, who
Seek to spread liberty, •qmal opportunity, anc
material progress throughout the world, will find that
these worthy objects depend, first of ell, upon the
survival of the United States and its allies; and
realizing thir, they will be forced to put the exigencies
of power politics ahead of their moral sensibilities.
similarly, if they want to pursue their ideals
effectively, they must base American aid to foreign
peoples primarily upon the power advantage of the
United States and only secondarily upon humanitarian
considerations. They must, at times, support
reactionary and antidemocratic regimes with arms and money.
1. M.aeloff , Foreign Policy and the Democratic Process , p.9^»
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They Bust even put themselves in the position
of resisting with force the misguided proponents
of a social revolution, which arises, in large part,
from basic human aspirations which the American
mission itself claims to fulfill." (1)
Although one may context some of the sweeping assumptions which
such an interpretation makes, it does, nonetheless, aptly describe
the inherent conflict of these two concepts in actual situations.
To allay the feeling that such conflict exists only due to the
rether exceptional environment that has been created today, one need
only observe the American Founding Fathers as they struggled to
resolve the dilemma posed by the conflict of ideals and realities.
Of the Founding Fathers, Thomas Jefferson was, perhaps, the most
addicted to theories and dreams. It is thus not surprising that he
stated:
"were I to indulge my own theory, I should wish them
to practice neither commerce nor navigation, but to
stand with Europe precisely on the footing of China.
We should thus avol- wars, and all our citizens would
be husbandmen. 11 (2)
let when Spain was reluctant to cede Florida, it was Jefferson who
confidently stated:
**if we push them strongly with one h.-nc, holding
out a price in the other, we shall certainly obtain
the Floridss :uid all in good time.' (3)
On broader terms, the same contrast is evident. The United States'
early foreign policy voiced the ideals of avoiding entanglements
with Surope and hence the avoidance of wars in which Americans had no
1. R.E.Osgood, Ideals and Self-interest in /mericw's Foreign Relatione
,
p.<0&.
2. L.halle, Dream and Reality (New York: Harper and Brothers, 195&)« p. 110.
3>. J.iarrell, Iheory and Reality in internationai Relations (N.Y.: Columbia
Univ. Press 1967 ) p. 81.
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interest, t.nd yet the first major action on the international scene was
to enter into a Treaty of internal Alliance with France. Hence the
ideals were, at least in part, overridden by the re.-l considerations
such as the need for support in American claims against Britain.
One could obviously cite many more such examples, but these
should suffice to firmly establish the existence of a real conflict
between realism and idealism that most definitely affects the final
form of any foreign policy.
Finally, as a means of eliminating any doubts that may remain
concerning either the existence of this conflict or its effects on
the formulation and implementation of foreign policy, one can observe
statements or articles by those who are involved in the actual decision-
making process of foreign policy which might describe their personal
attitude towards this question. For this purpose, I have selected
statements made by Henry Kissinger, Unitea States secretary of State,
and an article published by r.dward Heath, former British Prime Minister.
For years, the annual foreign policy reviews by President Nixon,
issued under the guidance of Kissinger, emphasized that the United
States gave precedence to American "interests" rather than American
iaeals. But, in an interview with the Hew fork Times, Kissinger
seems to have second thoughts on such an approach in light of occurrences
in i-ortug-1 and Greece. He "regrets that he was too willing to accept
the political status quo in his first five years, even if this meant
1
aiding author,, .srian governments whose internal policies he detested."
He thus reflects tEta i a vernal struggle between his own ideals and the
course ol action dictated by ufeat is perceived to be the realism of




the situation. That he remains a realist, nevertheless is readily
apparent pb he goes on to state that "the Kennedy period is likely
to be seen as the end of an era rather thfn a6 the beginning of one.
The 1-st grert flowering of the naive version of American idealism."
Heath, meanwhile, in an article of his published in Foreign Affairs
clearly demonstrates an awareness of the relationship between realism
and idealism as he notes,
"Looking back at the foreign policies of Britain and
the United states since loOO one sees two strands
woven closely together - the strands of idealism and
realism." (2)
He then adds that in present times the harmony between them has
faltered with a resultant inevitable increase in tension between the
claims of the two. He then admits that under this tension 'it has
3been the instinct of the British to plump for realism."
Hence it is quite obvious that these concepts of realism and
idealism are much more than mere topics of philosophical discussion.
They not only display clear relevance to the formulation and
implementation of foreign policy, but as demonstrated above, are most
definitely in the minds of the actual decision-makers themselves.
In conclusion one notes that there is in fact an inherent
source of conflict between idealism and realism at all levels of
human endeavour which can be explained, perhaps, by the assertion that
the reconciliation of ideals with self-interest is per se one of the
1. J.fleston, of the New York Times in The Sunday Times (October 13, 1974)
,
p.i4.
2. E.Heath, "Kealism in British Foreign Policy' Foreign .ffairs
(Oct. 1969) p.39.
3. Ibid . , p. 40.
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central problems of human experience. It is therefore hardly
surprising that such conflict should manifest itself in the decision-
making processes. All hope of reconciliation is not lost, though,
for, as illustrated above, the decision-makers are aware of the
problem and may thus come to realize that the Utopian who dreams
that it is possible fo eliminate self-assertion from politics and
to base a political system on morality alone is just as wide of the
mark as the realist who believes that altruism is an iliustion and
that all political action is based on self-seeking. This elimination
of destructive polarization is unquestionably the first necessary
step in solving the problems created by this conflict of interest.
Having thus laid the theoretical foundation of this clash between
realism and iuc L . one must then select a particular aspect of
foreign policy within which one can observe the effects of the clash.
In this case it will be the arms tr.'-ue.
i'o establish the unique position which the arms trade enjoys in
the formulation of foreign policy, it la first necessary to explain
what is meant by the "arms trade". Having done this, one must then
identify the special characteristic that virtually ensures its
incorporation into *.on's foreign policy,
The arms trade can be broauiy considered to be a by-product
of tne corapxtx economic, military, nu political forces th
determine tne creation, maintenance, and use of armea forces -
regular or irregular. Likewise, the relationship between the
recipient's need for arms anci the supplier's need for influence
uniquely characterizes the arms trade ana thus establishes the




Nevertheless, while the logic of such an argument points to the
undeniable existence of such a link, such a relationship is meaningless
unless it is perceived by those involved in the formulation of policy.
The statement of Paul Nitze, then 'united states Assistant Secretary
of Defense, in the lyG/ Congressional hearings on military t»hd
disapells any such fears M he noted:
"our entire arms policy is in fact an instrument of
foreign policy, and the military sales program is
en accurate reflection of considered agreement at
the highest levels of authority." (1)
Having thus identified the arms trade with the formulation of
foreign polity, one must then complete the picture by looking ht the
administrative body that transforms the commercial production of
armaments into such a powerful instrument of foreign policy.
Before doing so, though, it is pertinent to observe the conflicting
pressures that are brought to bear upon the foreign policy makers due
to the nature of the arms trade, once the forces demanding restraint
and those encouraging participation in this trade have been
identified, one must follow up and describe the forum within which
the different views are voiced, as noted above. &>uch a description,
together with the self-acknowledged posture of some of the major
suppliers of arms, will provide a useful insight into the internal
conflict thus generated as well as of the outcome of such a conflict
of interests*
That there is active restraint on the arms trade and that such
restraint is effective, at least in some countries, is clearly
demonstrated by a statement made in 196? by Henry Kuss, former head
1. Quoted in L.A.Irank, The Arms Trade in International delations
(London: Praeger, 19^9) p.l, .
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of the Uni'.eci states' arms sales program,
"in the previous five years the government has
turned down more arms sales to developing countries
than it has sanctioned" CD
Acknowledging the existence of such restraint is only the first step,
and thus it becomes necessary to look at the specific nature of
such restraint. UerUin idealists will point to "world opinion" am
the Ts.ngu-.rdl of such a pressure, but such a concept is not only vague,
it - 1 ."> r*rTlocks the identity of the anas trade with a n; tion's
foreign policy which was established above. *hiie it may be true
th~t policy-makers are sensitive to the opinions of other nations
their primary concern lies in what they consiuer to be their own country's
interests. In this context, sucn restraint is reflected in the personal
ideals of the policy-makers themselves as well as the embodiment of
the national ideals. That domestic rather than international
opinion has acted as a restrain on arms sales is clearly illustrated
by numerous examples. In 1967 a critical analysis of the purpose
and methods of Ame rms sales prepared by the staff of the
senate Foreign Relations Committee led to the foreign Hxiitary aales
Act of 1968. The Act passed as a direct result of Congressxonal
pressure which reflected the public unease about the volume and
scope of American military aid and sales. Jfore currently, the collapse
of a foreign aid authoriz. cxon bill under the weight of restrictions
on military aid to Chile, Vietnam, Laos', ^aabodia, ^ouui aorea, and
Turkey in October, 197^ c. . ..y demonstrates the strength of domestic
opinion, aweden, in 1963 yielded to the public outcry of left-wing
1. Quoted in J. Stanley, The International Trade in rms (London:
Chatto and Vindua, 1972) p.13.
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radicals, for domestic political reasons, over sales to Argentina,
and this resulted in a Swedish embrrgo of anas sales to Latin
Aaerict (except for Chile and Venezuela).
Restraiife. though, are not limited to moral com 'ions but
rather cover the full spectrum of foreign relations, Hence allied
military considerations, issues of international and domestic politics,
and many other such preoccupations all demand close control over
arms exports.
The pressures to sell, hough, are much greater than those
not to sell and include: the defense ministry's desire to bolster e
military ally and to lower its own procurement costs through the
lengthening of production runs; the finance ministry's balance of
payments considerations and what it aee& as the prospect of • direct
gain of revenue to the exchequer if the sale involves new or used
government -owned wetponr; ana tne foreign ministry's denire to export
arms in order to strengthen existing political bonds or forge new ones.
More specific, ily, though, the pressures to engage in the ?rffls
tr ^e en be divided into l) hegemonic/strategic, 2) nation
arms-production; 3) balance of payments, *+) surplus arms, and
Zi) social gain, and these will beconai tiered in detail below.
The question of hegemony or strategic considerations underlines
the fact that the arms trade is carried on primarily for reasons of
power. nile it may well be true that the United states and the
soviet Union I re the two powers for whom hegemony is the primary
reason for engaging in the arms trwde, it is also true that all the
other powers participating in kale trade have this very s? rae objective
at, or near, the top of their respective priorities. Such an objective
is founded on the belief that one tarn buy political influence by selling
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or giving away arms, and available information certainly tends
to support such a view. While critics of the ams trade point to the
exceptional c res where such attempts have failed, they do so by
overlooking the vast na^bers of cases where it his been successful
and ignore the fact that in those coses where it failed • rms were
cleeriy not the central issue.
that the ultimate result of the interaction of arms and influence
brougnt bout by the arms trade should be the transfer of control
to the "outsi ;e" of a country's previously internal policies as well
as its foreign and military policies is scarcely surprising,
considering the manner in which military sids and/or sales work,
besiues strengthening friends, the arms provide justification for sending
out large technical upport tearac to the ally concerned, thus
providing on opportunity to exercise 3ooe control over the military
policy of the client. These complex wwmt systems also entail
extensive training programs which offer the opportunity for the
establishment of a close working relationship between members of the
supplier's armed forces and military authorities in key foreign countries.
Finally, the training programs also provide an excellent opportunity for
ideological indoctrination which in faet forme a port of all training
•specially when the Soviet union la the supplier. The caaa of
Jigypt with 10,000 ooviet technicians and cdvisers integrated
at all levels in the fcgyptian military complex is a clear example
of how such aa I rr- ngement works, ; nd in answer to those who
herald the soviet effort in kgypt as a disastrous failure one needs
only to observe continued Soviet influence in spite of what seeaa
an insurmountable religious obstacle and extraordinary efforts by the
Americans to disrupt that influence.
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The inuustrial aspect of the arae trade ranks just below
hegemony as a reason for favouring active participation in such
an endeavour. The reason for such import- nee lies in the critical
contribution arms exports make to the m intenance of a national
arms-production capacity in the case of all arras-manufac taring
countries, except for the United States and the Soviet Union.
Therefore, for those countries, expansion into the export market
ay well provide the only Beans for the arma manufacturers to
remain in business without a government subsidy. Prance is
perhaps the best example of such a condition. As de Gaulle pursued
the objective of building a nuclear deterrent, the requirement
for conventional weapons were inevitably scaled down, thus threatening
the survival of firms such as D ssault. the French aircraft company.
Soon the firm's commercial well-being became heavily dependent on the
export market as exemplified by the estimate that 500 of the 85O
hirtge Ill's manufactured in 1969 were for export. More recently,
Dassault has been in the headlines in what has been termed "the sale of
the century" es NATO proceeds to renew its Air Forces and hss the choice
between Dassault's F.l and two American aircraft, the YF-16 and
IF-17. France's principal sales argument focuseu on the survival
of the Kuropean aircraft industry, and the intensity of her
committment is quite aptly illustrated by the Etehlin affair*. General
Stehlin, a former French Air Force Chief of Staff, stated inecuivocably
thr t both American aircraft were superior to the F-l and was consequently
brended a tn itor by certain members of the General Assembly and forced
to retire prematurely, I uch reliance on arms exports is not limited
1. J.-t^nley, The International Trade in 1 rms, p. 69.
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to France, though, and cases such as the British Company, ftacal
Llectronics, producing the squed call ck two-way radio, exporting
99% of its 1 8 output, uad the delgi- r. firm Lonale d* Annas
de Guerre exporting 90% of production to 1?0 countrit . .y illustrate
1
this widespread dependence on the crms tr.de.
Closely related to thia mainten nee oi rms-production
capacity is the ability of the arms trade to lengthen production runs.
This lengthening of the production run allows the manufacturer to
exploit ail the in nt?ges of economies of sc Lts in a lower-
priced final product which -.Hows the national defense establishment
to purchase it at this lower price and also m.*kee the product more
competitive in the international nirn^aents market. "~~
ther element favouring the promotion of arms 5 les is the
nee of payment ion. The effect of railit tivities
on the h-l^nce of p-yments li o*ething which has haunted both
Washington ->nd London. Hence the b\<l^nce of payments cost of military
deployment overseas has led to "offs^ cements" between Britain
snd Germany in 195& *nd the United States and Germany in L9ol.
Under these agreements Germany km* agreed to offset certain proportion
of the foreign exch nge costs to dri ad the United States in
stationing troops in Germany by making arms purch rom th
countries. That the attitude of supplier countries goes beyond the
off setting of outflows of exchange o by the over: eployment
of milit- ry forces is illustrated by V concern for her
balance of payments, and the role that arms exports will play in
alleviating the problem. Likewise , on< only needs to observe the
1. d. ey, The Intern- tion 1 Tr de in . rms, p.
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reaction of most *esteru ueinocrecies to the increase in the price of
oil to note the importance of arms export., on the bai nee of payments.
In many cases, the first reaction was to offer the latest, most
sophisticated, weapons syateme to the Arabs in the hopes of both
obtaining special favours and offsetting the inevitable massive
•Irain on the exchange.
The importance of arms exports in correcting a balance of payments
deficit mm be explained rather briefly without going into extensive
detail. JUiliy the favourable or unfavourable balance of trade is
quite small comparea to the total volume of goods exchanged, and thus
relatively small shifts in items making up the balance sma correct
any deficits. Jince weapons systems are high value items, a few well
ced ones can significantly alleviate a deficit or even reverse aa
aaverse balance, while the monetary return on these goods is 1-rge
though the net return is of equal importance, weapon*, use a high
proportion of national knowledge and skills and rel - tiv-iy high
proportion of materials that are domestically produced, and consequently
items such as aircraft represent an extremely favourable conversion
of national effort into saleable goods. Hence the intrinsic value
aii high 'conversion ratio makes weapons particularly tempting items
to sell for the purpose of increasing foreign exchange income. If to
this one t.dds the value of spare parts, the need to truin the
users, the sale of auxiliary equipment inciuuingsucn things <~b the
construction of airfields, the amounts involved rapidly become
highly significant. It im thus no wonder th±»t the preoccupation
with the balance of payments should most definitely increase the deter-
mination to sell arms.
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The matter of what to do with surplus anas also enters the picture,
especially in the 1970' s, es both the Vietnam war and the feet that
NATO end the WVreaw Pact are entering into major new generations of
combat aircraft -Tnour have ere.' ted tremendous bulge of arms
on the supply side. These countries pre freed with three options in
disposing with these surplus arms. They can be scrapped, demilitarized,
or sold.
repping la the best way to eliminate the transfer of arms to
undesirable localities but is also the least attractive option
financially. In 196? an M-V? surplus Pat ton tank had f scrpp value
of $2000 while the purchase contract for fully serviceable M-47 had a
-I
price tag of i?-2,000. Hence the 7,000 or so surplus M-^7 or M-*r8
tanks in Western Europe would have a #1*+ million scrap value versus
a $22^ million reselling value, fe strong economic argument indeed
against this first option.
Demiliteri nation, on the other hand, involves the removal of
certain lethal parts (in most cases), leaving the system serviceable
for civilian use ^nd has involved such o»see as Britain's conversion
of Sherman tanks into Sherrick tractors as well as the reselling of
2
"sporterized" rifles. th increased civilian technology and greater
restrictions on the outlet for non-automatic rifles, such as option
is hardly applicable. It thus becomes a question of scrapping or
selling, and as noted above the economic repercussions kite
substantial.





Finally one must consider the social benefits which the arms-
exporting country enjoys and which are therefore threatened by any
motion to reduce or suspend such a practice. These benefits include
employment, development of skilledlabour, ?=nd dynamic regional
policies. For the United States in the period 196?-6f this export
market consisted of #9 billion worth of orders and options which
represented 1.2 million man-years of employment throughout all fifty
states m well as #1 billion of profits to the comparies concerned.
A government en scarcely afford to take such figures lightly.
Besides the unemployment which would result from cutback in
the production of atm onenust consider the skilled Ibour that would
be affected. In t society, skilled labour has come to be
regarded m a natio. ] set. The conservation and management of such
an ssset i rr problem, for any society with a free labour market end
political represent?" tives -nxious to promote the well-being of
constituencies where defense industries are located. Such an
attitude applies enually well to regional policy, and there is evidence
- emment's employment and regionnl policies are closely tied
to the defense industry. Hence the Iteli^n government writes into
its defense contracts that 30# of the work must be given to the South.
In the United states such an approach waa well exploited by the lrte
Senator Russell of Geor; i Congressman Rivers of
couth Carolina who crerted defense empires in their respective states.
1. J.Ltanley, The International Tr? de in Arms, p. 72*
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Nevertheless it would be naive to presume that the social
argument? "re always compelling, and one cm cite numerous examples
of cutbacks in defense and f-erospece spending which resulted in
significant regional unemployment ?nd loss of skilled 1- hour. Yet
one must not overlook the political pressures that such soci
conditions represent.
It is thus immediately apparent that the pressure on policy-
Bakers is quite heavily biased towards the maintenance or even
expansions of the one may be temptdd to pursue
the implication- of such a bias ;;ch KB endeavour is beyond the
scope of this paper which will instead focus on the administrative
body where such pressures Te brought to be
The emph s on the ^dministrr>tive body rather than the
legislative bee-use it is in the former where the v .ority of
conflicts of interer* re resolved while the letter concerns itself
with the few most spectacular cases. While the bulk of the
information hereby presented concerns the American structure, it is
generally accepted that al3 r— ; .~»r . hav« similar arrangements.
Those who are ux ! of the nature of government control on
the prms trade ~nd thus observe thrt the production oiling of
these arms is carried out, in the vast majority of the by
private firms, may well v/onder if the only motive for ns
trade is the may Ion of profit, 11 else is nothing but
window-dressing. The fact is that governments do exercise almost
complete control over the export of arms by B< f export licenses.
Critics may well point to those i ^ , newsworthy
..
c res where arms
were shipped in spite of such restrictions, but again the overwhelming
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majority of the trdde operates within these restrictions. If the
consignment is considered to be in any way controversial, the
matter is referred to a joint meeting for the airing of all views.
It is within this body that the pressure of conflicting interests
is felt. The foreign ministry, and others so inclined, can exercise
restraining power, and the struggle between realists and idealists
is quite apparent. For this purpose, Britain has the Arms Working
Party and the United States has the State/Defense Coordinating Committee
and attention will be concentrated on the latter.
The State/Defense Coordinating Committee is primarily a
State Department/Pentagon entity, butkt also contains the gency for
International Development ^AlD), the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency (ACDA), and the Treasury. The Treasury raises question sof
terms of credit and balance of payments while AID and ACDA provide
additional restrains to those i tfvocated by tne btate Department.
Thus AID may oppose an arms sale which may retard the economic
development of non-industrial nations (an effect which hss been quite
evident in the arms trade with Latin America) while ACDA may voice
opposition by virtue of its general responsibility for arms control.
In many cases these two may be considered to be the embodiment of
idealism although it is obvious that each agency is primarily interested
in pursuing its own objectives. If the issue is not resolved by
this committee, it goes to the Under-Secretary of State for Political
Affairs, then to the Secretary of State, and, if necessary, to the
President himself. The general rule is such that an export license
cannot be granted by one ministry against the opposition of another




Most countries also control the retransfer of arms from the
country of destination to third country through the use of "end-use"
cl. uses which prohibit retrsnsfer without the prior approval of the
manufacturing country. The Lack of such a clause was recently
illustrated by Sritain's enbarrassment when Jordan resold uritish-
made tanks to South i fri.
That governments exercise complete control over the trade is thus
unaeni.ble, and the lack ol general principles on arms exports is
not. due to the 1 ck of government oontrol but rather to the fact that
international affairs shift too frequently. * riritish Foreign Office
Memorandum to a House of Commons select Committee in 19J?9 clearly
stated this condition as it noted:
"There is little room for generalization on Her
Majesty's (Jovemment • s policy on the ecport of artrifi,
since each case ia treated in the light of its
individual merits or disadvantages. (1)
While it may be true that there are no general principles that
are followed in the conduct of the arms trade, a country's posture on
the issue can be ascertained through either the statements made by
its policy-makers or through their actions in the field. Thus the
United States' position was clearly stated in 1963 by Robert McNaaara,
then becretery of defense, as he stated the three objectives of
American arms sales: y
"1. Promote the defensive strength of our allie
consistent with our politic; 1-economic objectives.
2« Promote the concept of co-operative logistics and
standardization with our allies.
3. Offset the unfavourable balance of payments resulting -
from essential United States military deployment abroad.**
1. Quoted in J.Stanley, The International Trade in rms
,
p. 16.
2. Quoted in Q. Thayer's The War Business, The International Trade in
Armaments (London: Paladin 1969 ) p.lc^.
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That such a statement was not mere rhetoric is evidenced by the
formation of the Office for International Logistics Negotiations
(ILN) under Henry Kuss with a stated objective to triple sales
within a nine year period (1962-1972) • There is evidence also that
these objectives are just as valid today if one notes the following:
the balance of payments is a continual preoccupation; one of the
principal political arguments in favour of an American aircraft in
"the sale of the century" is the need to standardize NATO weapons
systems; and in the post-Vietnam era there is an emphasis on
greater self-reliance for security and thus a need to strengthen those
allies through the Military Assistance Program.
While no comparable statement has been forthcoming from a
British Minister, Britain's approach to the export of arms can be
evaluated by noting the restructuring of the organisation responsible
for promoting the acquisition of British arms abroad. In 195^ the
post of Assistant Controller of Munitions was created to promote
British arms exports. Nevertheless, uritsin fell further behind in
her sales and in 196^, with the experience of ever-increasing balance
of payments difficulties, came the need for fresh government action
to promote arms exports. Thus Dennis Healey, then Secretary of State
for Defense, announced, in July 1965 1 that Donald Stokes (now Lord
Stokes), then managing director of Leyland Motor Corporation, was to
help in "the promotion of experts of defense equipment, and on any
changes of organization that may be necessary for this purpose."
A direct result of this was the appointment of Haymond drown, then
Chairman of Racal Electronics which had proved to be an outstanding
1. House of Commons Debates, vol. 716, 21 July 1965, Column 1560.
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successful exporter of military equipment, as Head of Defence
Sales. There is thus little doubt as to what British objectives in
the trade are.
France's position on the arms trade, meanwhile, is amply described
in a finance commission report to the ft tional Assembly on 2$ October
1967 noting that "as a purchasing nation we are not ana cannot be
sufficiently armed to realize sufficiently long production runs and
thus lower the net costs of procurement. We therefore have to provide
not only for national utilization of military material, but also for
its export." Such a posture certainly explains her unwillingness
to abide by such embargoes as the one on Louth Africa as well as the
reversal in 1967 on r rms to the hidale .bast as the .Arab market
became more desirable, '..bile her sales organisation ii less formal
than those in Brit' in and the United states, it is just as professional.
The direction ues Affaires Internationales (DAI) organizes the
dispatch overseas of military missions ana displays ox .trench weapons.
The promotion of aircraft is done through the office General de l'Air
ffice Franca!** d'lxportation de Materiel Aeronautique
MA) both of which are under government control, leather than
duplicating each other's efforts, the sales area of these two outfits
are divided geopolitics lly so that potential combatants negotiate with
different sales teams even if the product for sale is the seme. Thus
while India and Israel have negotiated with OFEKA, Pakistan and the
2
Arrb powers have negotiated with OQA.
.uoted in SIPBI, The Arms Trade with the Third World (London:
Paul LLek, 1971) pTS^
2. v . .ey, The International Trade in Arms, p.9>«
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There fca therefore no doubt but thet countries ere heavily
litted to the arms trade, i nd the conflict between ideal rcnd
re'l objectives is clearly exemplified by talking of pe r ce while
^ributing weapons of war. In a television intervie ry
196^, Dean Husk, then United States Secretary of State, pointed out
this conflict between aspirations and reality: "I recall that at
the United Bations General Assembly, at a time when all members
were voting unanimously for disarmament, ?0 members were at that moment
asking us for military assistance 1 *. The conflict is thus not limited
to the supply side of the tr&de.
The complexity of the dilemma facing the decision -makers is
illi >d by the matter of United States arms exports to Israel.
The problem becom> s one of balancing the need to preserve Israel's
security agaiaat the dangers of U.^. -Soviet confront tion as well
•a the further iienation of tnc rab countries. The problem becomes
infinitely rnore complex if one considers the attempt to restrc in
Israel from moving towards a nuclear option and the f. ct that a
nee of power based on parity is not accept;; ble due to Xaravl'a
inability to fight 1 pioionged nar« The options are far from Eimple.
Thus it is possible to separate the forces of repliant edvoc ting
hegemony, production runs, nc b 1 nee of payments con ion- aa
the basir upon which the ^rms trade should be based frou the idealists
who point to the need for economic development, the throat to pe ce
ere ted by armaments, *nd the sheer waste of resources of such a
practice. While the conflict, as noted above, is by no means limited
to the clash between rec md idealists, this issue is at the centre
1. quoted in G.Kemp "Arms Sales end Arms control in the developing
countries 1 ' The woria Today September, 19t>t>), p. 391-
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of aoot such strife. 1though it may be true that the pressures
•.re heavily biased in favour of those advocating the ex jn of the
arms trade, it is equally true hose advocating restraint can
be extremely effective when organized appropri tuly.
finally governments, in deciding whether or not to engage in the
arms tr.-.de, ahould keep the long-term effects of .rus aid in mind
at all times. One insight into these effects is iiluelr ted by
interview of an exiled taouerate in the jungles of C—smdli (Whits
Prince Sihanouk was still in power) as the exile asked, "Do you
mericans rsalize what you are doing to We be^t hira (Sihanouk) in
repeated elections nnd parliaments. But every time we made a show of
force
. his control of -lnioot everything, there were those
American guns, those American police patrol cars those Araeric
walkie-talkies and riot control methods, their users trained by /mericans
in your police academies. What do you want am to think of Americans
1
when we get power, as we someday will."
The case of Great Britain's arms trade with South Africa is
an excellent illustration of this struggle between realists and
idealists in the formulation of foreign policy because it embodies all
the high pressure elements of the arms trade. The strategic and
economic considerations are therefore, not surprisingly,
focussed upon by those who favour such a trade while its opponents
emphasize the abhorrence of South African internal policy and the
need to condemn such a policy not only verbally but through forthright
action as well, meaning an arms embargo. The splitting of this
confrontation along political party lines provides the generating force
1, Davis, f« "Patterns and Problems in U.S.foreign Policy"




that yields continuous debate as well am the disclosure of
information which would otherwise remain buried ii ' h archives.
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lanes orally assumed to come from Soviet n-v-1 forces, ouch
th> lch mor i the concept of the menace of unchallenged
viet power because the shipping 1 a which she
depenc vival ./ice i ry. of
her food n<i f» of her oil using thU; route, her
concern for curity of the Cape is certainly v ?d. To those
who n;l gue th supply could only
occur if the powers were engaged i 11-out war which due to its
<*« ny discussion of ehippi meaningless,
one c-n r oting President Kennedy who stnted the
er to the being nibbled to e- th in conditions of
nuc" The closing of the Sue? -erved
to highlight the i of th- route nnd even with the
•turn to o ; on in the future shipping round the
r
- will Li :- both b - of tl -nt of
reluctance
of shipping firms to rely on the volatile ( f the Hiddla
Tht egic importance of th e route is ur ble,
but one n one c on th ity of outh Afric n
vy, even if it l r to pur- nunbei to
cope with the existing, or the potential thre
1. House of Commons Debate, Vol. Nov.1970, Col. 528.
led in "The Cape Route / report of a aeminnr he? the
Kc^ ervice Institution (.London: KUSI, Feb. 1970), p.l.
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The matter of airfields and overflying rights likewise has great
strategic significance especially when one considers that in 196*+ one
third of British forces deployed overseas were -;st of Sues and in
potential need of rapid reeuppl, reinforcement. With only four
possible routes from ririU in to the Indian Ocean, the potential
problem is soon apparent. The Libya-^uc n route to auen and Singapore
is restricted by the understanding that no flights for military
purposes will be permitted if the conflict is with other rab countries.
The route from Cyprus across Turkey, Iran and Pakistan brings aircraft
dangerously close to the Soviet border ond is subject lo m shift of
allegiances with these countries. The third route is poli ically
secure, but is four times as long since it is the westward route across
the United otates and the Pacific >jce;.n (United Kingdom to Aden -
16,780 miles). The fourth route involves flying across the African
subcontinent which, with the exception of South Africa, is politically
unreliable. Thus it it; quite obviou? the air route across
South is indeed tne best option available under conditions
of international stress, rievertheless such a requirement muse be
evaluated using present rather than pai.t realities so t Britain
terminates all its commitments Last of Suez, access to such a reliable
air route .imited rather than essential importance. In fact it soon
becomes obvious that the whole strategic ignificance of the Gape area
can be summed up in words such as "important but not essential", and
should therefore not be considered to be an overriding factor when
deciding the pertinent policy.
mother argument which is y presented concurrently with
the stratigic one is the view that the Simonstown Agreement requires

36.
Britain to supply aouth Africa with the necessary equipment to carry
out the role of defending the Cape route. At fact th t the greeoent
carrie
.plied obligation since the negotiation of ,~n agreement
necessarily involves a willingness to supply the oth r with
the meanc to carry it out is whet the Louth irican government refers
to as the spirit'' of the Agreement. It i _lied obligation what
has been used by the Conservative party both as a reason for supplying
with weapon., during periods when tiu ervatives were
in power and as one of the main themes of their exho ed at
convincing Labour to do likewise. hen referring to this obiigr. tion, the
world "implied 11 is emphasised I .y contractual obligation under
the Agreement had been fulfilled by 19CJ through the sale of various
val weapons systems. It is neverthaieta quite obvious that the
Coneerv
. ue aouth n regime consider such an obligation
to be truly binding. Not only h ve they st; ted so unequivocably,
but have backed their position by ne-na of Law
Officer's opinion of the legal implications of the Agreement. The
conclusion of this opinion stated d a legal commitment
to proviue aouth /' frica with the nrfASP helicopters for the frigates
provided under the Agreement. 1 The validity of this leg 1 ^Ludy,
though, is highly questionable since it is based on the V..
Convention adopted in 1969 which cont- inc non-retro' c^ve cause thus
negating its application to an agreement reached in 1955- -uch
technicalities seldom botherpoliticians and consequently the
Conservatives feel that there is legal obligation for Britain to
provide I rras for .Couth Arrica's extern*- i uefense.
1. ...Laurie, Britain's obligations under the Limonstown agreements"
,
Int. Affairs (Oct. 1971).
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There are also those Conservatives who fell th*t the Agreement
<th I frica Britain's ally as Mr.Barber noted in March 1970 by
stating ''South Africa ie ottx lly and we will tret it as ruch . 1
ex th-t assumption, the provision of self-defame armaments ie
certainly warranted ^nd cannot be contested although one may well
wonder about the value of ouch an alliance to n.
While strategic considerations and the need to uphold the
r. Agreement form the core of the public >ur
of the arms trsde with iouth nfric?, economic factors are of equal or
perhaps greater importance but are not made public due to • desire
to avoid creating an impression th't ideals are being ;ed
for the sake of money. Nevertheless, statements such mi the one by
i., Conservative M.F. for Maitenprice, which noted "why
should my constituents be put out of work when French and It:.lian
workers thrive on contracts worth millions of pound Ly
express the economic impact of this issue, ouch ) concern for the
economic aspects of this arrcs trade is not restrict to the Con.-erv^tive
camp, for it was Harold Wilson as i^rioe Minister who w ok to
emphasize that an arms embargo did not affect the position on general
trade and agreed with the view that trade was not means of
3
expressing detestation of particular policies.'
1. Quoted in M.Christie, The . iiflonstown ^recnencs, p.
2 * The Times . June 1970, p.9.
3. House of Commons Debates, 25 November, 196^, Vol. col. 1.32.
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The economic factor- themselves can be subdivided into trade and
investment, bal once of payments, and business expect e-.ch
one of these provides a powerful nt for avoiding regrettable
confrontation between the two countries. The importance of £outh
Afri rtner is immediately apparent when one
notes
. exports to South Africa tot.-;l over £.300 m. a year
fourth 1 . marke ,1 ri . ; n relies on
icfc for v row m including chi nd rutimony.
Britirh investrnents in South Ifrica ere likewise a powerful motive
for ensuring c- close relationship since they are valued at well over
X) million which result in annual earnings exceeding £60 million.
It is not surprising that the realists wouldr e to jeopardize such
holcings for th I eal . Additionally there is the economic
.ity of the s- La of the weapons systems themselves which is clearly
ill ed by the over £200 million worth of equipment which France
lea during the 1964-70 British embargo. The social
onomic repercussions to Britain in relinquishing this trade to the
Jrer. clerrly illu nt by Mr.Merten, Minister of
»B, in May 1963 in which he asserted that in the case of the
contract which amounted to &P0 million, some
50 col; were involved in the manufacture, and the work involved
a year's employment for ?5>000 people including 4,000 in electronics
8,000 in ancillary industries.
n. Britain and South j . iric-. (London: Oxford University Press,
1966) p. 155.
2. House of Commons Debates, Vol. - , 1963, *-ol « 25»
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The economic pressures favouring the arms trade are therefore very
real indeed ana while one may refute the argument that normal trade and
investment are necessarily threatened by a refusal to sell armaments to
South Africa, though there is strong evidence of some damaging effect
during the 19uh-/0 embargo, the remaining economic considerations
are still valid. The essence of this economic argument was perh
best expressed by Geoffrey Nippon who observed that the Labour government's
policy of giving greater responsibility to South Afrit* for defending
the Cape while refusing to sell her arms to make that defense effective
created a situation where the only beneficiaries were other e '.era
European countries who were ready to step in and supply ^outh Africa's
. 2
neeas.
The realists, though, are not content with thir stalemate betv/een
idealistic and realistic considerations, and they thus seek to
minimize the conflict between them. Not only do they verbally condemn
apartheid at every conceivable opportunity, but they also note that the
arms in question are for external defense and not for repression and
emphasize that isolation and ostracism are not the solution to the
problem. This attempts to differentiate between weapons used for
external defense and those used for repression and anti-gueri
I
purposes f»«pmr. part of every Conservative speech on the subject of the
arms trade, une may well wonder about the validity of such a differentiation
in the case of the duccaneer bombers. The view that isolation 2nd
ostracism are no effective in attempting to <hfnge mouther African
1. Stanley Vys, "Tories to Vorster: Hold Arms deal" The Observer
21 J.«n.l968 p.l.
2. G.Kippon, "The importance of oouth Africa'1 survival ^u>ndon:
Institute for Strategic studies, bept. 1970).
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such »n attitude was etill prevalent p.n Lord Winterbottom. then
ry Under-Secretary for Defenre, nuoted the United ff- tions
resolution
-s being the primary renson for the embargo when he was
off' 1 opportunity to use thr heid issue b: Ltakail,
he simply continued to ir Her Majesty's government was
bound by the United Natiou resolution.
Thoee who support Labour* position ^iso point to the on of
well ?.!S members of the Commonwealth to this
^nce thct their at nee is right. >;r.A uu resident
of voiced the feelings of the African n. tionc by ati ting tt.
Sou' rfos the enemy and .nyone who helped an enemy could not
be conficered to be friend. He went on to add that Britain w*»s
threatening the ^ommonwe «lth by aiding r ciri. regime. nother
interview h- in providing ^rms to South Africa,
must decide between investments in South Africa and the reat of the
Continent and the same choice in ;ic interest since other i :rican
:ions could well turn to non-western or ^nti -western powers.' The
Commonwealth reaction to Brit. -in nouncemer: ea
to Couth would be resumed certainly wupportt opinion
Ugjsn nd Ceylon all threatened to withdraw
from the Coamonwe lth while Malaya suggested th^t Britaia should be
the one to go. Letter from Mr.Irudeau, '« Prime Minister,
strongly recommended that Mr. Heath should reconsider i step was
cle.^r evidence that the Coiiuaonwealth's white members were
1. Houre of Lords Debate, vol. 310, 12 May 1970, Col. '>
2. H. Berkeley, Friends and enemies", The Observer , 11 Oct. 19^0, p. 11.
3. The Observer, 28 June 1970, p. 8.

against a resumption of the tr?ide. ihe conservative government was
-e obviously not expecting tuc .. .ion t r oiicy
which pei. es the ;Joi. xvet.' failure ne
ootic c rticul iience v..-,. ne
-ogic su., ^ic import, not 01 the
coulo ox* Lj ->n their
aet.
.ur was pursu objective baseu on i~ it
oy high^igncing what is considered to 6.
obligation to retr-in irons supplying ~outh
as the . ji potent., ce, investment, sad goou thoee
coun - a to sucb s tr.
. e noting what eii'ecvw on pt. OO&fli
re< - do a side-effect
of ( on tho.
overiooKt . to ignore, - . . -efiec
.
rade.
pre. intended lor maritime aefense onij
it ii- shown Dot p i in
maritime uefense the weapons .aoie for bat rssp< Llltj
i give- fear than foi . if
tne reet 01 . frleaji woi imiiar ;.ctit_ 3f
oviet .
mat *ill be peiceived . t Brit l ii -i the
regim-. rica*
Looking at the .^outh African military eeu blishment , one
: tains th«-t ii is completely oriented tow.-rci. fci-
guerriii.; role in composition of the forces tneir tr. ining, and the

nature of their exercises. Most of the defense budget goes to the
Army, the Air force, and para-military forces including a part-time
rural militia called the Commandos ( ,0,000 men given eytlml training
for internal security duties). In the 1969-70 defence budget only
was allotted to maritime defense, and the training of neval
forces focuses on internal security as well rather than any
Soviet naval threat. The largest defense exercise in years,
con was a simulated -uerri rvolving
i>000 troo, uaorons of ht nd a variety oi I ke-
bomberr cher aircrafts; nothing even resembling such an
exercise has been conuucte« in the areo of maritime defense. X>3
efense minister stated mi kite
cle ue noted: i»e force > help
cy ret'. ^changed.
nt on the intention
of ret. arms trade, er of Defense.
.v/is of value if a condition
co-operation between sell respecting coun trier i and
by erapi. ..g the respecting" aspect he w< deeper
he oou the sale of
seve ore was one of utter ool of the
coiu. ccep / as a mi ^ploms i t can thus
be li at as to th* a co provide
:se arms and auai eemeat because only
semblance . i.>.nce ham with the est.
. ogracr
__













on th» ^licy. In tbj L6
simplified by the split between the Labour ive parties on
owe ono to note policy cl which follow & change
in government. Nevertheless, one should not overlook the restraining

forces wfaj ^ng prL . given pox. ice uieae
lyo^, . -.a was
t were
- even an
;e, a lixlfertati . .mttn
sale of the













cms -*. did e^i og
in C pe xov.u ad tde
two i<;.vies continu | . tereia**.
ower in 19' 0, the I
siubeUui..-- . i,»±**> of

Nimrod maritime rvtrol aircraft, frig-tee «*nd destroyers, buccaneer bombers,
end sen dart missiles all designed to strengthen oou-..
external defense ana boost an tain's economy. Dm mmlma
contracts tor the first year amounted to ^d Billioj . id
seven V.AbA- helicopters, six S transpor S .ports
and one survey ship. ' i'nis, tnougn was me Halt ve
effort to overturn U=boui >^icy because l. i esistance encountered
both dome. within tne oommonwe >tcn .ized the
re ^uraents. Hence tne t-aie of weapons lor ex
to include only "k *.iy
reduced to those considered to be 'a leg^i oblige tic. ae
recrren^ 9 owing the second electic , with
our returning to powe? otory
as .' ;2 rtMfl
greetr.ente wj ci disengaging mi froa any
existing ry obligations tow
Thu • with
of the confront' -t ton betw. .n the
for on of policy, it con- i-es
which ch; r cceri-e the ;nns tr I ^he effect o; • pressures
I ve been I rent. Lives*
."onomi-- deve succ - ^se
their significance - I
undc- the emot ure o: joue. other
.is sensitive
situation e allowance for them La -eels.




<~ n between re^liaa
pi] theoretical concc
. e awax ^..t-j
aae been • u ensure
;ic nu.*;. Nevei ^.n
. . our of
Its. eci re reflect! i foreign
policy, mi-, *• noted *bove, uo n&ve their momente oj .i/nph.
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